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 APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCING 
POLICY DECISIONS AFTER KIMBROUGH 
CARISSA BYRNE HESSICK* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court drastically altered appellate review of 
federal sentencing decisions in United States v. Booker.
1
  Booker held that the 
once-mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines are now advisory, and it 
instructed the appellate courts to review all district court sentencing decisions 
for ―reasonableness‖—a virtually unknown standard of appellate review.2  
After the decision in Booker, several circuit splits developed over how to 
conduct this new form of appellate review, and the Court heard a series of 
cases to resolve these conflicts.  One of these post-Booker cases, Kimbrough 
v. United States,
3
 involved a district court‘s authority to sentence a defendant 
outside of the Guidelines range based on a categorical disagreement with the 
policy underlying the crack cocaine Guideline.  Although obviously intended 
to clarify appellate review, the Court‘s opinion in Kimbrough has actually led 
to additional confusion and created new circuit conflicts.
4
 
The Court‘s recent federal sentencing cases, beginning with Booker, 
resemble a tightrope act: The Court is endeavoring to walk a fine line between 
district court sentencing discretion and preserving some adherence to the 
Guidelines through appellate review.
5
  Because appellate review is, by its 
terms, a limit on district court discretion, the Court‘s post-Booker sentencing 
jurisprudence is inherently contradictory.
6
  The Court has tried to ensure that 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Sandra Day O‘Connor College of Law, Arizona State 
University.  J.D., Yale Law School.  B.A., Columbia University.  Thank you to the participants and 
attendees at the Criminal Appeals: Past, Present, and Future Conference, which Marquette University 
Law School hosted on June 15 and 16, 2009.  Thanks also to Jelani Jefferson Exum, Andy Hessick, 
Mary Sigler, Judy Stinson, and Doug Sylvester for their helpful comments on this project, and to 
Amy Coughenour for her research assistance. 
1. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
2. Id. at 245, 261. 
3. 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
4. See The Supreme Court, 2007 Term: Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 276, 327 (2008) 
[hereinafter Leading Cases] (―Kimbrough . . . illustrated and arguably increased the post-Booker 
tension between mandatory and indeterminate sentencing.‖). 
5. See id. at 330 (noting ―the tension between mandatory and advisory sentencing created by 
the Booker remedy‖). 
6. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions, 60 
ALA. L. REV. 1, 29 (2008) (―The Booker remedy is fundamentally schizophrenic in that it attempts to 
increase district court discretion in order to avoid Sixth Amendment problems, but at the same time it 
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district courts continue to sentence according to the Guidelines, but at the 
same time it has said that the Guidelines are not mandatory.  To date, the 
Court has attempted to ensure district court compliance with the Guidelines 
through appellate review.
7
  But, because strict appellate review would 
ultimately eliminate district court discretion, the Court has had to twist the 
appellate process
8
 and issue opinions, like Kimbrough, that contain facially 
inconsistent statements.
9
  Kimbrough tells appellate courts that they must 
allow district courts to categorically disagree with the sentencing policy 
underlying the crack cocaine Guideline, but it did not extend that holding to 
all Guidelines.  To the contrary, the Court cautioned that district court 
disagreements with other Guidelines may be subject to ―closer review‖ by the 
courts of appeals. 
This language has resulted in differing approaches to other policy 
disagreements in the circuits.  Some have essentially ignored the closer review 
dictum, while others have tried to determine which Guidelines are entitled to 
closer review—and these efforts have created additional circuit splits.  Still, 
other appellate courts, clearly unwilling to deal with the uncertainty created 
by Kimbrough, have decided to recharacterize district court sentencing 
decisions as driven by case-specific factors so that they need not take a side in 
the developing conflicts. 
The confusion after Kimbrough is endemic in modern federal sentencing.  
That the Court‘s opinion in a case that was designed to clarify appellate 
review after Booker has resulted in more confusion and new circuit splits is 
not only ironic, it also suggests that the Court‘s attempt to preserve the 
Guidelines‘ centrality through appellate review may ultimately be doomed to 
fail.  This Article argues that there may be a better way to encourage district 
courts to sentence within the Guidelines—namely, for the United States 
Sentencing Commission (the Commission) to attempt to persuade district 
courts that the policy decisions underlying the Guidelines and the resulting 
sentencing ranges are appropriate.  If a district court agrees with the substance 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, then it is likely to impose a Guidelines 
sentence, even if it has the discretion not to do so.  This approach avoids the 
impossible task of satisfying contradictory goals, and it should result in a 
more coherent law of sentencing. 
 
seeks to preserve uniformity through appellate review, which by its nature is a limitation on district 
courts.‖) (footnote omitted). 
7. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 263 (stating that ―sentencing appeals . . . would tend to iron out 
sentencing differences‖). 
8. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 6, at 18–28 (detailing how the Court‘s post-Booker cases 
diverge from ordinary principles of appellate review). 
9. See id. at 34–35 (noting inconsistent statements in the Court‘s post-Booker cases); Leading 
Cases, supra note 4, at 333 (noting ―the contrast between [Kimbrough‘s]  holding and its dicta‖). 
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The Article proceeds in six parts.  Part II describes the cases leading up to 
the decision in Kimbrough.  Part III critiques the Kimbrough decision.  Part 
IV explains how the federal appellate courts have read the Kimbrough opinion 
in different ways, giving rise to the ensuing circuit splits.  Part V offers a 
solution to the Court‘s sentencing conundrum, namely that the Commission 
ought to promote adherence to the Guidelines by persuading district courts 
that the policies underlying the Guidelines are appropriate.  Part VI concludes. 
II.  HOW THE COURT ARRIVED AT KIMBROUGH 
Prior to 1984, federal sentencing was left almost entirely to the discretion 
of district court judges.  District court sentencing was restricted only by the 
statutory maximum sentence and, for some offenses, a statutory minimum 
sentence; appellate review was essentially unavailable.
10
  The Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 (the SRA
11
) drastically restricted the discretion of federal 
sentencing judges.  The SRA created a sentencing commission to develop 
mandatory guidelines limiting available sentences in particular cases.
12
  The 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines assigned narrow sentencing ranges within the 
broader statutory sentencing limits.  These Guideline ranges were based on a 
number of variables, including the offense of conviction, the circumstances 
surrounding the offense, and the defendant‘s prior criminal convictions.  
Judges were permitted to sentence outside the Guideline range only in the few 
situations expressly permitted by the Guidelines,
13
 or where the sentencing 
judge found ―there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, 
or to a degree, [that was] not adequately taken into consideration by the 
Sentencing Commission in formulating the [G]uidelines that should result in a 
sentence different from that described.‖14 
The Supreme Court dramatically changed federal sentencing practice in a 
series of cases interpreting the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right, which 
culminated in Booker.  The first of these cases, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
involved a state statute that increased the maximum sentence for the unlawful 
possession of a firearm from ten to twenty years imprisonment if the 
sentencing judge found that the defendant possessed the firearm to intimidate 
 
10. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 6, at 4. 
11. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2017 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.). 
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006). 
13. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K (2008) (identifying appropriate and 
inappropriate grounds for departure). 
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006); see also KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF 
JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 101–03 (1998) (noting, prior to 
Booker, that this provision severely hampered district court ability to depart from the Guidelines).  
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someone because of his or her race.
15
  The Apprendi Court struck down the 
statute, stating that, other than a prior conviction, ―any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.‖16  Four years after 
Apprendi, in Blakely v. Washington, the Court held that mandatory sentencing 
guidelines can violate the Sixth Amendment if a judge‘s sentencing discretion 
is limited to a range narrower than the statutory range unless the sentencing 
court makes particular factual findings.
17
  The Blakely Court explained that 
mandatory guidelines fall within the Apprendi rule because ―the ‗statutory 
maximum‘ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may 
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted 
by the defendant.‖18 
Less than a year after deciding Blakely, the Court in Booker held that the 
mandatory Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment because, in many 
situations, they restricted federal judges‘ ability to sentence above the 
Guideline ranges unless the judges engaged in judicial fact-finding.
19
  
Although the Supreme Court‘s previous Sixth Amendment sentencing cases 
required the court to abandon mandatory sentencing guidelines based on 
judicial fact-finding, a majority of the Court was unwilling to submit 
sentencing facts to juries, because it would limit the ability to sentence based 
on ―real conduct‖20—the manner in which different defendants commit the 
same offense in different ways.  If sentencing facts had to be found by a jury, 
then parties would engage in plea bargaining for sentencing facts, which 
would seriously decrease the influence of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines.
21
  Thus, instead of requiring federal prosecutors to submit 
sentencing enhancements to a jury,
22
 the Booker Court adopted an unexpected 
remedy: The Court rendered the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory by 
severing the statutory provision making the Guidelines mandatory, and it 
directed district courts to impose sentences based on a balance of various 
 
15. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
16. Id. at 490. 
17. 542 U.S. 296, 304–05 (2004). 
18. Id. at 303. 
19. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).  For example, a court could 
increase a defendant‘s sentence above a particular Guidelines range if it first made factual findings 
regarding whether the defendant used a gun in the commission of the offense, see, e.g., U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.6 (2008), or how much economic loss the defendant 
caused, see, e.g., USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1). 
20. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 250.   
21. See id. at 256.  The remedial Booker majority also expressed concerns about the practical 
implementation of proving sentencing facts to juries.  Id. at 254–55. 
22. Four justices supported such a remedy.  See id. at 272, 284–87 (Stevens, J., dissenting in 
part); id. at 313, 313 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part). 
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factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
23
  The Booker Court also modified 
the appellate standard of review for federal sentencing decisions.  Before 
Booker, appellate courts generally reviewed sentencing determinations 
de novo.
24
  Booker held, however, that sentencing decisions would be 
reviewed for ―reasonableness.‖25  Reasonableness is an unusual standard of 
appellate review,
26
 and since Booker was decided in 2005, the Court has heard 
three additional cases to clarify how appellate courts ought to review district 
court sentencing decisions. 
The first of these post-Booker cases, Rita v. United States, authorized 
courts of appeals to review within-Guidelines sentences using a ―presumption 
of reasonableness.‖27  The second case, Gall v. United States, rejected a rule 
adopted by several courts of appeals that had required district courts to give 
―‗proportional‘ justifications for departures from the Guidelines range.‖28  The 
Gall Court clarified that ―[r]egardless of whether the sentence imposed is 
inside or outside the Guidelines range, the appellate court must review the 
sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.‖29 
The third case in which the Court clarified the appropriate scope of 
appellate review was Kimbrough v. United States.
30
  The issue in Kimbrough 
was whether a district court may impose a sentence outside the Guidelines 
range based solely on a policy disagreement with the Sentencing 
Commission‘s treatment of crack cocaine.  Federal criminal law‘s treatment 
of crack cocaine has long been controversial,
31
 as a defendant convicted for a 
crack cocaine offense is, for sentencing purposes, treated the same as an 
offender convicted for an offense involving 100 times more powder cocaine.
32
  
 
23. Id. at 245–46. 
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006). 
25. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261 (directing appellate courts to ―determine whether the sentence ‗is 
unreasonable‘ with regard to § 3553(a)‖). 
26. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 6, at 9–11, 14–16. 
27. 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007). 
28. 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (citation omitted). 
29. Id. at 51. 
30. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
31. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein, The Notorious 100:1 Crack: Powder Disparity—The Data Tell 
Us that It Is Time to Restore the Balance, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 87, 91 (2003) (advocating a 
reassessment of the ―distressing and embarrassing 100:1 disparity in the sentencing guidelines for 
crack compared to powder cocaine‖); William Jefferson Clinton, Op-Ed., Erasing America’s Color 
Lines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2001, at WK17 (arguing for reducing the sentencing disparity between 
crack and powder cocaine); Ted Sampsell-Jones, Culture and Contempt: The Limitations of 
Expressive Criminal Law, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 155–56 (2003) (collecting ―street culture‖ 
criticisms of the crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and 
Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1298–1301 (1995) (arguing that the crack/powder cocaine 
disparity should raise equal protection concerns); see generally DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL 
UNDER LAW: RACE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS (2007). 
32. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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Several circuits had held that district courts were bound to apply the crack 
Guideline, which incorporated this 100-to-1 ratio, unless there were case-
specific circumstances warranting a non-Guidelines sentence.
33
  The 
Kimbrough Court held that district courts have the ability to sentence outside 
of the Guidelines range based on a categorical disagreement with the 
crack/powder cocaine disparity, suggesting that district courts are free to base 
sentencing decisions on policy disagreements with the Guidelines as opposed 
to case-specific factual circumstances.
34
 
The government‘s brief in Kimbrough conceded ―that the Guidelines ‗are 
now advisory‘ and that, as a general matter, ‗courts may vary [from 
Guidelines ranges] based solely on policy considerations, including 
disagreements with the Guidelines.‘‖35  However, the government argued that 
the crack/powder cocaine disparity was ―an exception to the ‗general freedom 
that sentencing courts have‘ . . . because the ratio is ‗a specific policy 
determinatio[n] that Congress has directed sentencing courts to observe.‘‖36  
The 100-to-1 sentencing ratio for crack versus powder cocaine derives from 
Congress‘s 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which set different mandatory 
minimum sentences for crack cocaine than powder cocaine.
37
  The Kimbrough 
Court ultimately rejected the government‘s argument that the crack/powder 
cocaine disparity was mandated by congressional policy, stating, inter alia, 
that Congress ―mandate[d] only maximum and minimum sentences . . . .  The 
statute says nothing about the appropriate sentences within these brackets, and 
we decline to read any implicit directive into that congressional silence.‖38 
Although the Kimbrough Court held that district courts are free to 
 
33. See United States v. Leatch, 482 F.3d 790, 791 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); United States 
v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 515, 522 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 62–63 (1st Cir. 
2006); United States v. Castillo, 460 F.3d 337, 361 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 
625, 633–34 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Miller, 450 F.3d 270, 275–76 (7th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1369 (11th Cir. 2006).  But see United States v. Pickett, 475 F.3d 
1347, 1355–56 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the district court erred when it concluded that it had no 
discretion to consider the crack/powder cocaine disparity in imposing a sentence); United States v. 
Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 248–49 (3d Cir. 2006) (same). 
34. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101–02; see also Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 844 
(2009) (confirming that district courts may reject and categorically vary from the crack/powder 
cocaine Guidelines even in a ―mine-run case where there are no ‗particular circumstances‘ that would 
otherwise justify a variance from the Guidelines‘ sentencing range‖) (citation omitted). 
35. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101 (quoting Brief for the United States at 16, Kimbrough v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (No. 06-6330), 2007 WL 2461473 (alteration in original)). 
36. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States at 16, 25, Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 
(2007) (No. 06-6330), 2007 WL 2461473). 
37. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).  It imposed a five-year mandatory 
minimum on any defendant accountable for five grams of crack or 500 grams of powder, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(h)(1)(B)(ii), (iii) (2006), and a ten-year mandatory minimum on any defendant accountable for 
fifty grams of crack or 5,000 grams of powder, § 841(h)(1)(A)(ii), (iii). 
38. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 102–03. 
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sentence outside the Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with the crack 
cocaine Guideline, the opinion did not appear to adopt the government‘s 
broad concession ―that as a general matter, ‗courts may vary [from Guidelines 
ranges] based solely on policy considerations, including disagreements with 
the Guidelines.‘‖39  Instead, the Court appeared to place some limits on the 
ability of district courts to sentence based on policy disagreements to cases 
involving particular Guidelines.  The Court intimated that district courts are 
not constrained by the crack/powder cocaine sentencing ratio because the 
crack cocaine ―Guidelines do not exemplify the Commission‘s exercise of its 
characteristic institutional role.‖40  The Court noted in ―formulating 
Guidelines ranges for crack cocaine offenses, . . . the Commission looked to 
the mandatory minimum sentences set in the 1986 Act, and did not take 
account of ‗empirical data and national experience.‘‖41  The Court indicated 
that, ―in the ordinary case, the Commission‘s recommendation of a sentencing 
range will ‗reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve 
§ 3553(a)‘s objectives.‘‖42  And, in such an ordinary case—that is, in a case 
where the Guidelines in question do ―exemplify the Commission‘s exercise of 
its characteristic institutional role‖43—―closer review may be in order‖ when a 
district court bases its decision to impose a non-Guidelines sentence on a 
policy disagreement.
44
  The Court reiterated this possibility of ―closer review‖ 
in a subsequent case, Spears v. United States, stating that a district court‘s 
―‗inside the heartland‘ departure (which is necessarily based on a policy 
disagreement with the Guidelines and necessarily disagrees on a ‗categorical 
basis‘) may be entitled to less respect.‖45 
III.  CRITICISMS OF THE KIMBROUGH OPINION 
The Court‘s opinion in Kimbrough can be criticized on a number of 
grounds: It contradicts a number of nonsentencing legal doctrines, and it has 
led to confusion and conflict in the circuits, some of which is directly 
attributable to the Court‘s reliance on a largely inaccurate picture of the 
Guidelines as derived from empirical study.  The Kimbrough opinion departs 
from ordinary legal principles in two distinct ways.  First, as I have argued 
elsewhere, the decision in Kimbrough turns ordinary appellate practice on its 
 
39. Id. at 101 (quoting Brief for the United States at 16, Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 
85 (2007) (No. 06-6330), 2007 WL 2461473). 
40. Id. at 109. 
41. Id. at 109–10 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(McConnell, J., concurring)). 
42. Id. at 109 (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007)). 
43. Id.  
44. Id.  
45. Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 843 (2009) (per curiam). 
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head by requiring appellate courts to defer to district courts‘ policy 
decisions.
46
  ―Policy decisions‖—as the term is used in Kimbrough—are legal 
determinations, and are thus ordinarily subject to de novo review.
47
  But 
―de novo appellate review of substantive sentencing policy determinations 
would functionally reinstate the mandatory system condemned in Booker 
because it would inevitably result in binding legal rules defining sentencing 
ranges.‖48  Deferential review largely avoids this problem,49 but it does so by 
sacrificing uniformity. 
Second, the Court‘s analysis regarding which Guidelines are deserving of 
―closer‖ appellate review also runs counter to ordinary principles of 
administrative law, as it seems to suggest that district courts have a greater 
obligation to defer to the policy determinations of the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission than to the policy determinations of Congress.
50
  The 
crack/powder cocaine Guidelines were, according to the Kimbrough Court, 
acceptably disregarded by district courts because 
 
The Commission did not use [its ordinary] empirical 
approach in developing the Guidelines sentences for drug-
trafficking offenses.  Instead, it employed the 1986 Act‘s 
weight-driven scheme.  The Guidelines use a drug quantity 
table based on drug type and weight to set base offense 
levels for drug trafficking offenses.  In setting offense levels 
for crack and powder cocaine, the Commission, in line with 
the 1986 Act, adopted the 100-to-1 ratio.
51
 
 
 
46. See generally Hessick & Hessick, supra note 6. 
47. Id. at 26–27. 
48. Id. at 30; see also id. at 30 n.149. 
49. Cf. Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) 
(stating that a judicial holding that one interpretation is reasonable does not bar an agency from 
adopting a different, reasonable interpretation).  
50. Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of 
Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1491–92 (2008). 
 
Most curiously, the opinion suggests that implementing the will of Congress is 
the exception for the Commission, and that where the Commission is merely 
responding to the requests or mandates of Congress, sentencing judges have 
freedom to disagree with the policy judgments embedded in the Guidelines. 
Where, on the other hand, the Guidelines represent ―empirical analysis,‖ judges 
are generally not free to disagree with the policy judgments they embody . . . .  
Of course, reflecting the will of Congress is ordinarily a basis for judicial 
deference to administrative regulations. 
Id. 
51. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 96–97 (2007) (citation omitted). 
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The Kimbrough Court also noted that, based on ―additional research and 
experience with the 100-to-1 ratio,‖ the Commission later concluded that the 
crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity ―fails to meet the sentencing 
objectives set forth by Congress in both the Sentencing Reform Act and the 
1986 Act.‖52  The Commission has, on more than one occasion, 
communicated its new conclusions about the crack/powder cocaine sentencing 
disparity to Congress and suggested that Congress ought to revisit the  
100-to-1 ratio reflected in statutory minimum sentences.
53
  Congress has, to 
date, not acted on those findings or the Commission‘s suggestion. 
The Kimbrough Court‘s decision to permit district courts to deviate from 
Guidelines that the Commission itself now disavows makes some sense.  
After all, the Commission is an expert agency, and thus its conclusions 
regarding crack and powder cocaine should carry some weight.
54
  However, 
the Commission is not the only governmental body that has expressed an 
opinion of the appropriate sentencing policy.  Congress‘s determination that a 
100-to-1 ratio is appropriate is reflected in its 1986 drug legislation, and that 
determination formed the basis for the original crack cocaine sentencing 
Guidelines.  But the Court essentially accorded this congressional policy 
decision no weight.  In saying that district courts are free to disagree with the 
crack/powder cocaine disparities in the Guidelines because they are the 
product of a Commission effort to effectuate a congressional policy choice, as 
opposed to the Commission‘s ordinary empirical process, Kimbrough is 
inconsistent with administrative law principles.  The principle underlying one 
of the stronger forms of judicial deference to administrative action—Chevron 
deference—is based, in part, on the idea that the agency is acting in accord 
with Congress‘s wishes.55 
Aside from disregarding ordinary legal principles, Kimbrough has led to 
 
52. Id. at 97 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND 
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 91 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/02crack/ 
2002crackrpt.pdf [hereinafter COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY]. 
53. See, e.g., COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY, supra note 52, at 93; U.S. 
Sentencing Comm‘n, Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (Apr. 
1997), reprinted in 10 FED. SENT‘G REP. 184 (1998). 
54. Cf. United States v. Anderson,  82 F.3d 436, 450 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald, J., 
dissenting) (discussing district court authority to depart from the crack Guideline after the 
Commission issued a report critical of the crack/powder cocaine disparity; noting that ―surely the 
Commission as a data collection body must have significant expertise concerning the impact of its 
own guidelines‖ and that ―if this were a run-of-the-mill administrative law case, I predict that we 
would not hesitate for a moment to vacate an agency‘s legislative rule, if the agency itself admitted 
that the rule was arbitrary, capricious, unfair, and violative of a federal statute, and then documented 
that admission with credible evidence‖). 
55. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also 
Stith, supra note 50, at 1492 (―[R]eflecting the will of Congress is ordinarily a basis for judicial 
deference to administrative regulations.‖). 
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confusion and conflict in the circuits.  One specific feature of Kimbrough that 
is causing circuit confusion and conflict is the Court‘s analysis regarding 
which Guidelines are deserving of ―closer‖ appellate review.  The Court‘s 
dictum on this issue is based on the premise that most Guidelines are the 
product of Commission expertise.  Kimbrough notes that ―Congress 
established the Commission to formulate and constantly refine national 
sentencing standards [and that] the Commission fills an important institutional 
role [because it] has the capacity courts lack to base its determinations on 
empirical data and national experience, guided by a professional staff with 
appropriate expertise.‖56 
But this description of the Sentencing Commission‘s institutional 
strengths and the process by which the Guidelines were written is not entirely 
accurate.  For one thing, the empirical process that the Court repeatedly 
praises
57
 is methodologically suspect.  For another, a great number of 
Guidelines were not based on the empirical process.  Kimbrough‘s failure to 
accurately describe how the Guidelines were developed and amended may 
lead to circuit court confusion and conflict because identifying which 
Guideline deviations are subject to closer review will require litigants and 
courts to dissect the origin and amendments of each Guideline.  Kimbrough 
suggests that courts must attempt to determine whether the present Guideline 
is sufficiently derived from ―‗empirical data and national experience.‘‖58  If a 
court believes that a Guideline is based on suspect methodology or has either 
promulgated or subsequently amended a Guideline in a fashion that deviates 
from ―empirical data and national experience‖—whatever that might mean—
then it must decide whether that Guideline is entitled to closer review.
59
  And 
that is a question likely to be answered differently by different judges.
60
 
Prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Breyer served as 
one of the original U.S. Sentencing Commissioners and is often referred to as 
the principal author of the original Guidelines.
61
  Soon after the Guidelines 
were originally promulgated, then-Judge Breyer published a law review 
article in which he described the process by which the Guidelines were 
created: 
 
56. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 108–09 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
57. Kimbrough, like the opinion in Booker and its other progeny, contains laudatory language 
about the Sentencing Commission.  Id. at 109–10; see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 348–49 
(2007); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,  
252–56, 264–65 (2005). 
58. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th 
Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J., concurring)). 
59. See id. 
60. Cf. Leading Cases, supra note 4, at 331 (noting that ―Kimbrough left judges with little 
guidance on how to incorporate or review policy disagreements and related factors‖).  
61. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 14, at 58. 
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Faced, on the one hand, with those who advocated ―just 
deserts‖ but could not produce a convincing, objective way 
to rank criminal behavior in detail, and, on the other hand, 
with those who advocated ―deterrence‖ but had no 
convincing empirical data linking detailed and small 
variations in punishment to prevention of crime, the 
Commission reached an important compromise.  It decided 
to base the Guidelines primarily upon typical, or average, 
actual past practice.
62
 
 
The Commission had access to the sentences imposed for tens of 
thousands of cases, and it used the average sentences imposed as a ―numerical 
anchor for guideline development.‖63  But while the Commission‘s process 
could accurately capture the length of sentences that judges imposed, it was 
poorly designed to identify the sentencing factors that influenced past 
sentencing practice.
64
  As Kate Stith has noted, ―there were no available data 
in most presentence reports with respect to many of the factors that the 
Sentencing Commission decided were most relevant to a sentence; nor did the 
Commission seek to determine what factors the sentencing judges in the 
sample of 10,000 cases actually considered in imposing sentence.‖65  That this 
empirical process did not accurately determine the ―past practice‖ of judges 
 
62. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which 
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 17 (1988). 
63. U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 22 (1987) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT]; see also 
Breyer, supra note 62, at 17 (―The numbers used and the punishments imposed would come fairly 
close to replicating the average pre-Guidelines sentence handed down to particular categories of 
criminals.‖); Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne’er-Do-Well to the Criminal History Category: The 
Refinement of the Actuarial Model in Criminal Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 125 (2003) 
(―The [C]ommission used the average sentences (conditioned on the percentage of persons actually 
sentenced to prison) as the basis for their final deliberations.‖). 
64. The Commission used data from past cases to try to isolate variables that played a role in 
increasing or decreasing an offender‘s sentence, but as then-Judge Breyer noted, the Commission 
faced ―uncertainty as to how a sentencing judge would actually account for the aggravating and/or 
mitigating factors . . . .‖  Breyer, supra note 62, at 19.  To the extent the Commission tried to use past 
sentencing practice to identify sentencing factors, then-Judge Breyer described the following process:  
―The Commission was able to determine which past factors were important in pre-Guideline 
sentencing by asking probation officers to analyze 10,500 actual past cases in detail . . . .‖  Id. at 18.  
But it was judges not probation officers who ultimately decided what sentence to impose and what 
sentencing factors to consider in selecting that sentence prior to the Guidelines.  Id. 
65. Stith, supra note 50, at 1491; see also Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Improving the 
Guidelines Through Critical Evaluation: An Important New Role for District Courts , 57 DRAKE L. 
REV. 575, 578 (2009) (citing STITH & CABRANES, supra note 14, at 61) (noting that ―when the 
Commission drafted the original Guidelines it had limited data concerning past practice, and the data 
it did have was sketchy‖). 
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regarding which facts were relevant in sentencing almost certainly is reflected 
in the Guidelines: The Guidelines contained far more aggravating than 
mitigating factors,
66
 and they largely failed to account for an offender‘s 
background, other than her criminal history, which seems inconsistent with 
pre-Guideline sentencing practice.
67
 
The process that the Commission used to determine past practice has been 
the subject of repeated methodological criticism.  Bernard Harcourt, for 
example, has noted that the Commission ―did not create a statistical model to 
replicate judicial decision making, but instead used a basic averaging 
approach to estimate existing sentencing practices along certain variables.‖68  
Harcourt has also stated that the Commission‘s ―actual methodology is 
somewhat mysterious; the methodological appendix to the sentencing 
guidelines does not meet social science standards and seems almost 
deliberately intended to obfuscate discussion of the methods used.‖69  Kate 
Stith and José Cabranes have noted that ―the Commission diminished the 
advantages of relying on past sentencing practices by failing to do so in any 
systematic way.‖70  They also note that ―the Commission‘s data analysis was 
limited, and possibly compromised, in several fundamental respects.  The 
Commission conceded that for several categories of offenses it simply did not 
have sufficient data to ascertain average past practice.‖71  And because ―the 
Commission arbitrarily excluded sentences of probation, [it] significantly 
skewed the data relating to past practice because approximately 50% of 
defendants in the preguideline era received sentences of probation.‖72 
Whatever the merit of the Commission‘s empirical process, it is 
indisputable that the Commission elected to deviate from past practice in a 
 
66. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L. 
REV. 1109, 1128 (2008); Michele A. Kalstein et al., Calculating Injustice: The Fixation on 
Punishment As Crime Control, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 575, 605 (1992). 
67. See, e.g., United States v. Daniels  446 F.2d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 1971) (suggesting that 
sentencing courts have a duty to consider ―all of the circumstances surrounding the commission of 
the crime and the past life and habits of the [defendant]‖); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 
14, at 79–80 (commenting that, prior to the enactment of the Guidelines, ―the largest section of the 
presentence report‖—which was an important document for a judge‘s sentencing deliberations—
―dealt with the personal history and circumstances of the defendant‖); Kalstein et al., supra note 66, 
at 604 (―In direct contrast to sentencing practices [prior to the SRA], the Guidelines effectively 
forbid the court to consider the personal characteristics of the defendant (except for criminal history) 
and focus instead on the offense and the defendant‘s role in the offense.‖). 
68. Harcourt, supra note 63, at 123. 
69. Id.  Harcourt also identifies a ―number of inconsistencies‖ in the report the Commission 
issued explaining the initial Guidelines.  Id. at 123 n.122 (discussing SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, 
supra note 63). 
70. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 14, at 60. 
71. Id. at 61. 
72. Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 65, at 578. 
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significant number of areas.
73
  As a general matter, the Commission elected to 
limit the number of factual distinctions between offenders (i.e., the number of 
sentencing factors).  Reasoning that ―the more facts the court must find . . . , 
the more unwieldy the [sentencing] process becomes,‖74 the Commission  
self-consciously forbade courts from considering factors that previously 
played a role in sentencing decisions.  Individual characteristics of a 
defendant—factors that traditionally played a largely mitigating role—―were 
determined to be either not relevant or not ordinarily relevant‖ to sentencing 
decisions.
75
  The Commission not only deviated from past practice with 
respect to sentencing factors, but also with respect to sentence lengths.  In 
formulating the initial Guidelines, ―the Commission provided for significant 
increases in sentences for major categories of crime . . . .‖76  Indeed, as other 
commentators have noted, the ―categories of offenses, for which the 
Commission conceded it purposely deviated from past practice . . . actually 
far outnumber the remaining categories of cases.‖77 
Since they were originally promulgated, the Guidelines have drifted 
further away from their original empirical basis.  There have been ―hundreds 
of amendments to the original Guidelines, most of which increase penalties at 
the express direction of Congress.‖78  The Supreme Court did not appear to 
take note of this trend in its recent sentencing opinions.  Discussing Justice 
Breyer‘s description of the Guidelines in Rita, Paul Hofer has said: ―Absent 
from his description of the Commission‘s work is any discussion of the role 
played by mandatory minimum penalty statutes, specific directives from 
Congress to the Sentencing Commission to increase penalties or set them at 
particular levels, or the many other ways that Congress has shaped the present 
Guidelines.‖79 
The Kimbrough Court‘s simplistic description of the Guidelines‘ 
promulgation being an ―empirical process‖80 and their subsequent 
 
73. E.g., United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 173 n.7 (2d Cir. 2008) (collecting sources 
indicating that the Guidelines did not, in fact, accurately represent past sentencing practice).  
74. Breyer, supra note 62, at 11. 
75. Harcourt, supra note 63, at 126. 
76. Stith, supra note 50, at 1491; see also Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 65, at 578 (noting 
that ―the Commission, without serious explanation, increased the severity of sentences for a number 
of offenses‖). 
77. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 14, at 60–61. 
78. Stith, supra note 50, at 1491; see also Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 65, at 578 (noting 
that ―since enacting the original Guidelines, the Commission has amended many of them, making 
them even more severe‖). 
79. Paul J. Hofer, Empirical Questions and Evidence in Rita v. United States, 85 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 27, 47 (2007). 
80. The Court‘s decision in Gall, decided the same day as Kimbrough, included the following 
remark: 
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amendments being based on ―national experience‖ is misleading.81  This 
inaccuracy is problematic because the Court has suggested that the level of 
appellate scrutiny for non-Guidelines sentences that are based on policy 
disagreement may turn on whether a particular Guideline was derived from 
―empirical data and national experience.‖82  In determining whether Guideline 
deviations are subject to closer review, courts of appeals attempt to identify 
the origin and amendments of each Guideline and determine whether the 
present Guideline is sufficiently derived from empirical data and national 
experience.
83
  But because the Kimbrough Court did not acknowledge ―the 
many other ways that Congress has shaped the present Guidelines,‖84 courts 
have reached different conclusions about the same Guidelines.  For example, 
the Eleventh Circuit undertook an analysis of the child pornography Guideline 
§ 2G2.2, concluding that this Guideline 
[does] not exhibit the deficiencies the Supreme Court 
identified in Kimbrough.  First, the Guidelines range is 
derived at least in part from the early Parole Guidelines, 
rather than directly derived from Congressional mandate. . . .  
Second, there is no indication that either the Guidelines 
range or the policy statement . . . suffers from any criticisms 
like those Kimbrough identified for the crack cocaine 
Guidelines.  There, the Supreme Court found that the 
Sentencing Commission itself had ―reported that the 
crack/powder disparity produces disproportionately harsh 
 
 
Notably, not all of the Guidelines are tied to this empirical evidence.  For 
example, the Sentencing Commission departed from the empirical approach 
when setting the Guidelines range for drug offenses, and chose instead to key 
the Guidelines to the statutory mandatory minimum sentences that Congress 
established for such crimes.  This decision, and its effect on a district judge‘s 
authority to deviate from the Guidelines range in a particular drug case, is 
addressed in Kimbrough v. United States. 
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46–47 n.2 (2007) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 1A1.1 (2006); Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (2007)). 
81. As Judge Lynn Adelman and Jon Deitrich have recently explained, ―few guidelines can be 
shown to be based on actual preguideline sentencing practice or on Commission research and 
expertise,‖ and many of the subsequent Guideline amendments ―came in response to Congress‘s 
actions—either its establishment of mandatory minimums or its directives to the Commission.‖ 
Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 65, at 578–79. 
82. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th 
Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J., concurring)). 
83. This may be difficult because ―[t]he only account of the Commission‘s so-called  
past-practice study, the Supplementary Report on the Initial Sentencing Guidelines and Policy 
Statements, is unlikely to contain evidence that a particular guideline reflects past practice.‖  
Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 65, at 580. 
84. Hofer, supra note 79, at 47. 
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sanctions.‖  Here, the Sentencing Commission has not made 
any similar statements; rather, the Guidelines and policy 
statement are based in part upon Congress‘s longstanding 
concern for recidivism in such cases . . . .
85
 
Notably, several courts disagree with this closer review analysis of the 
child pornography Guideline.
86
  The Seventh Circuit has stated that 
the child-pornography sentencing guidelines, like the drug 
guidelines at issue in Kimbrough v. United States, are 
atypical in that they were not based on the Sentencing 
Commission‘s nationwide empirical study of criminal 
sentencing. . . .  ―[M]uch like policymaking in the area of 
drug trafficking, Congress has used a mix of mandatory 
minimum penalty increases and directives to the 
Commission to change sentencing policy for sex offenses.‖87 
A number of district courts have concluded ―that the child-pornography 
guidelines‘ lack of empirical support provides sentencing judges the 
discretion to sentence below those guidelines based on policy disagreements 
with them.‖88 
The child pornography Guideline is far from the only Guideline whose 
present ranges are not solely a reflection of ―past practice or any of the 
laudatory guideline amendment processes envisioned in the Sentencing 
Reform Act, but instead the will of Congress expressed through the medium 
of the sentencing Guidelines.‖89  Thus, it is quite possible that the circuits will 
continue to disagree about which Guidelines are entitled to closer review in 
the event of district court policy disagreement.  Indeed, the circuits 
 
85. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1201 n.15 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). 
86. Assistant Federal Public Defender Troy Stabenow has written a paper detailing how these 
guidelines, like the crack/powder cocaine guidelines, were based largely on congressional directives 
rather than empirical study.  Troy Stabenow, Deconstructing the Myth of Careful Study: A Primer on 
the Flawed Progression of the Child Pornography Guidelines (July 3, 2008) (unpublished paper), 
available at http://mow.fd.org/3%20July%202008%20Edit.pdf. 
87. United States v. Huffstatler, 561 F.3d 694, 696–97 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted) 
(quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS 
OF SENTENCING REFORM x (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/ 
15_year_study_full.pdf). 
88. Id. at 697 (collecting cases). 
89. Hofer, supra note 79, at 47–48; see also Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 65, at 579 (―Many 
of the Commission‘s amendments increasing the severity of sentences came in response to 
Congress‘s actions—either its establishment of mandatory minimums or its directives to the 
Commission.  Such amendments obviously are not based on Commission research and expertise.‖)  
(footnote omitted). 
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themselves have commented about the lingering state of appellate uncertainty 
after Kimbrough.
90
  Perhaps in an attempt to avoid this uncertainty, several 
courts have recast what appear to be district courts‘ policy disagreements with 
the Guidelines as case-specific reasons for imposing a non-Guidelines 
sentence.
91
  Such a recasting permits courts to review district court decisions 
under the more simple abuse-of-discretion standard articulated in Gall,
92
 
rather than forcing appellate courts to grapple with the closer review language 
in Kimbrough.  Indeed, one opinion noted that, because ―the District Court did 
not vary from the Guidelines range ‗solely‘ based on a disagreement with its 
ability to properly reflect § 3553(a) considerations,‖ the court did not need to 
―elaborate further on what the ‗closer review‘ and ‗less respect‘ mentioned in 
Kimbrough . . . might entail.‖93  Another court was even more direct, stating: 
Given our conclusion that the sentence imposed by the 
district court is not based on a simple disagreement with the 
policies underlying [the Guideline], as opposed to something 
about [the defendant‘s] personal characteristics or history, 
this court need not delve into a difficult antecedent question: 
how this court should review district court sentences based 
simply on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines.
94
 
Until the Court adopts a more realistic view of the Guidelines‘ 
promulgation and amendments—and until it explains how its Kimbrough 
dictum about closer review ought to function under this more realistic view—
 
90. See, e.g., United States v. Barron, 557 F.3d 866, 871 (8th Cir. 2009) (―The Court has been 
equivocal about whether a sentencing court owes greater deference to guidelines that do exemplify 
this ‗characteristic institutional role,‘ and whether closer appellate review is warranted with respect 
to variances from such guidelines.‖); United States v. Mikowski, No. 08-1791, 2009 WL 1546375, at 
*5 n.9 (6th Cir. June 3, 2009) (quoting United States v. Grossman, 515 F.3d 592, 597 (6th Cir. 
2008)) (noting that ―[t]he extent to which a district court may offer a wholesale disagreement with a 
guideline as the basis for a variance remains unclear after Kimbrough‖); United States v. Evans, 526 
F.3d 155, 168 (4th Cir. 2008) (Gregory, J., concurring) (―While I have closely studied the post-
Booker Supreme Court triumvirate of Rita, Kimbrough v. United States, and Gall, I must conclude 
that the Court has left the specifics of how appellate courts are to conduct substantive reasonableness 
review, charitably speaking, unclear.  Inevitably, as is the nature of appellate courts, vacuums of 
legal uncertainty left by the Supreme Court are quickly filled in a circuit by circuit manner, 
sometimes resulting in a grab bag of possible solutions.‖) (citation omitted); see also United States v. 
Gil-Hernandez, 309 F. App‘x 566, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (characterizing whether Kimbrough has an 
impact on fast-track sentencing disparities as a ―complicated‖ question). 
91. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 284 F. App‘x 719, 721–22 (11th Cir. 2008); United States 
v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Simmons, 568 F.3d 564, 569–70 
(5th Cir. 2009) (noting that a non-Guidelines sentence imposed because of ―the special conditions of 
a particular offender‖ is not subject to ―closer review‖ and then concluding that the district court‘s 
sentence was ―based on the particular circumstances of this defendant‖). 
92. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
93. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 570, 571 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
94. United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1311 n.13 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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confusion and disagreements are likely to persist. 
IV.  WHAT APPELLATE COURTS HAVE DONE AFTER KIMBROUGH 
In light of the ambiguous language contained in the Kimbrough decision 
and the criticism that can be leveled at the opinion, it may come as no surprise 
that the circuits have taken several different approaches to reviewing district 
court policy determinations after Kimbrough.  Indeed, the Court has already 
decided an additional case in order to clarify some ambiguous dicta from 
Kimbrough that led several circuits to permit district courts to vary from the 
crack cocaine Guidelines based only on individual case or defendant 
characteristics, rather than based on categorical policy disagreements.
95
  
Spears v. United States confirmed that ―district courts are entitled to reject 
and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy 
disagreement with those Guidelines,‖ as opposed to case-specific criteria.96  
But several other points of contention remain, including whether to follow the 
closer review dictum, what effect Kimbrough had on prior circuit precedent, 
and whether certain Guidelines represent policy choices by the Commission 
or by Congress.  The circuits disagree on each of these questions. 
The circuits have taken divergent approaches on the question of whether 
district court policy disagreement with certain Guidelines—those that were 
the product of empirical data and national experience
97—ought to be subject 
to closer review.
98
  The Second Circuit, skeptical of these dicta in Kimbrough, 
noted that it does not ―take the Supreme Court‘s comments concerning the 
scope and nature of ‗closer review‘ to be the last word on these questions‖99 
and that the reference to closer review 
cannot be construed as a signal to view non-Guidelines 
sentences with inherent suspicion or to establish a higher 
standard of review than abuse of discretion for some non-
Guidelines sentences.  While an appellate court may 
certainly consider the extent of a Guidelines variance as well 
as any policy concerns informing it in reviewing the totality 
of circumstances bearing on the reasonableness of a 
 
95. The following language from Kimbrough appears to have misled post-Kimbrough courts: 
―[T]he [district] court did not purport to establish a ratio of its own. Rather, it appropriately framed 
its final determination in line with § 3553(a)‘s overarching instruction to ‗impose a sentence 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary‘ to accomplish the sentencing goals advanced in 
§ 3553(a)(2).‖  Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007).  
96. Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 843–44 (2009). 
97. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109. 
98. Id. 
99. United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 192 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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challenged sentence, what it may not do is review the district 
court‘s fact finding for anything other than clear error.100 
The Fourth Circuit has similarly noted that, although the Kimbrough 
opinion indicates that ―closer review may be in order,‖ if a district court 
disagrees with Guidelines policy in a ―‗mine-run case,‘. . . regardless of 
whether the district court has agreed or disagreed with the Commission, we 
may only review the reasonableness of the sentence imposed.‖101  And the 
Fifth Circuit has, at least in one opinion, read Kimbrough expansively, stating 
that a district court may disagree with all Guidelines policy decisions because 
―Kimbrough does not limit the relevance of a district court‘s policy 
disagreement with the Guidelines to the situations such as the cocaine 
disparity and whatever might be considered similar.‖102 
Not all circuits have been so dismissive of the Kimbrough dicta.  Others 
have analyzed the process by which a Guideline was developed when 
reviewing district court policy decisions.  For example, the First Circuit 
engaged in a detailed analysis to determine whether the fast-track departure 
Guideline is similar to the crack/powder cocaine disparity.  The court 
reasoned that, like the crack/powder cocaine disparity, ―fast-track departure 
authority has been both blessed by Congress and openly criticized by the 
Sentencing Commission‖ and that ―the fast-track departure scheme does not 
‗exemplify the [Sentencing] Commission‘s exercise of its characteristic 
institutional role.‘‖103  These similarities led the First Circuit to conclude that 
a non-Guidelines sentence ―premised on perceived inequities attributable to 
the availability elsewhere of fast-track departures would, given the Supreme 
Court‘s new gloss, seem to be entitled to deference ‗even in a mine-run 
case.‘‖104  And, as discussed in more detail above, several courts have 
analyzed whether the child pornography Guideline is the product of empirical 
 
100. United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 173 (2d Cir. 2008).  The Second Circuit has even 
pointed (in dicta) to other Guidelines, which if the subject of district court policy disagreement, 
―should be reviewed especially deferentially.‖  Cavera, 550 F.3d at 192.  The Cavera Court 
specifically identified those ―Guidelines enhancements and reductions [which] apply without 
modulation to a wide range of conduct,‖ including the Armed Career Criminal Guidelines and those 
financial Guidelines that ―drastically vary as to the recommended sentence based simply on the 
amount of money involved.‖  Id.  This suggests an entirely different standard for deferential appellate 
review than whether a Guideline was the product of empirical data and national experience. 
101. United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 165 n.4 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kimbrough, 552 
U.S. at 109; Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). 
102. United States v. Simmons, 568 F.3d 564, 569 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kimbrough, 552 
U.S. at 101).  The court went on to note the closer review language and observe that this language 
―might require further case development.‖  Id. 
103. United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 227 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Kimbrough, 552 
U.S. at 109) (alterations in original). 
104. Id. (quoting Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109–10). 
2009] POST-KIMBROUGH APPELLATE REVIEW 735 
data and national experience.
105
 
In the wake of Kimbrough, circuit court judges have disagreed whether 
Kimbrough‘s recognition that district courts may sentence outside the 
Guidelines based on a policy disagreement extends beyond the crack/powder 
cocaine disparity to other Guidelines.
106
  The district court policy 
disagreements discussed include the career offender Guideline,
107
 the fast-
track Guideline,
108
 the terrorism Guideline,
109
 the child pornography and 
exploitation Guidelines,
110
 local community characteristics,
111
 and acquitted 
conduct.
112
 
 
105. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
106. Compare United States v. Vandewege, 561 F.3d 608, 610–11 (6th Cir. 2009) (Gibbons, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (―Neither Kimbrough nor Spears authorized district courts to 
categorically reject the policy judgments of the Sentencing Commission in areas outside of crack-
cocaine offenses, as the majority suggests.  Kimbrough instead expressly reserved the question as to 
whether a district court could categorically vary from the Guideline range based solely upon a policy 
disagreement with the Commission in an area other than the crack-cocaine disparity . . . .  The 
Supreme Court only hinted that if a district court could categorically depart from the Guidelines 
range in an area where the Commission has exercised its ‗characteristic institutional role,‘ closer 
scrutiny of such a variance may be required.  Kimbrough has thus not ‗made it clear‘ that district 
courts may vary from the Guidelines based solely upon any policy disagreement.‖)  (citations 
omitted), with United States v. Lente, 323 F. App‘x 698, 712–13 (10th Cir. 2009) (Holmes, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (―Although Kimbrough arose in the crack-powder cocaine context, we 
have not questioned that its holding concerning policy disagreements extends beyond that context.‖).  
And some courts have noted the question, but not decided the issue.  E.g., United States v. Johnson, 
553 F.3d 990, 996 (6th Cir. 2009) (―[W]e express no opinion on whether the principles articulated in 
[Kimbrough and] Spears may apply outside of the crack-cocaine context to allow district courts to 
develop categorical alternatives to other sentencing enhancements contained in the Guidelines that 
‗do not exemplify the Commission‘s exercise of its characteristic institutional role.‘‖) (quoting 
Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 843 (2009)). 
107. E.g., United States v. Boardman, 528 F.3d 86, 86–87 (1st Cir. 2008) (indicating that 
policy disagreement was permitted).  
108. E.g., Rodriguez, 527 F.3d at 227 (permitting policy disagreement); United States v. 
Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d 736, 741 (9th Cir. 2009) (prohibiting district court disagreement). 
109. E.g., United States v. Tankersley, 537 F.3d 1100, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2008) (addressing 
only whether the district court disagreed with the Commission on congressional policy; not 
addressing the closer review issue). 
110. E.g., United States v. Huffstatler, 561 F.3d 694, 696–97 (7th Cir. 2009).  As the 
Huffstatler Court noted, a number of district courts have concluded ―that the child-pornography 
guidelines‘ lack of empirical support provides sentencing judges the discretion to sentence below 
those guidelines based on policy disagreements with them.‖  Id. at 697 (citing cases).  It appears that 
the government has appealed at least one of these decisions.  United States v. Grober, 595 
F. Supp. 2d 384, 412 (D.N.J. 2008) (sentencing defendant to sixty months imprisonment, well below 
the Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months), appeal docketed, No. 09-2120 (3d Cir. Jan. 28, 2009). 
111. E.g., United States v. Politano, 522 F.3d 69, 73–74 (1st Cir. 2008) (appears to have been 
decided on case-specific grounds, but recast in Rodriguez, 527 F.3d at 230, as permitting policy 
disagreement); United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 201 (2d Cir. 2008). 
112. E.g., United States v. Ibanga, 271 F. App‘x 298, 300–01 (4th Cir. 2008) (categorizing as 
―procedural error‖ a district court‘s categorical exclusion of acquitted conduct from its sentencing 
decision, despite the district court‘s stated reasoning ―that sentencing based upon acquitted conduct 
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The differing treatment for the various policy disagreements appears to 
depend not only on whether the circuit employs the closer review 
contemplated in Kimbrough, but also two other issues.  The first is how a 
circuit analyzes Kimbrough‘s effect on previous circuit precedent.  Some of 
the post-Kimbrough circuit splits appear to be attributable to how the circuits 
treat intervening Supreme Court cases that undermine the reasoning of prior 
opinions from their own circuit.  Some circuits have concluded that the 
reasoning in Kimbrough abrogates prior circuit opinions that forbade district 
courts from disagreeing with particular Guidelines.  The First Circuit, for 
example, has taken a relatively broad view of Kimbrough‘s effect on its prior 
decisions, on the theory that, even if Kimbrough did not directly overrule prior 
precedent, it ―offers a sound reason for believing that the former panel, in 
light of fresh developments, would change its collective mind.‖113  Other 
circuits, such as the Ninth
114
 and the Eleventh,
115
 have construed Kimbrough‘s 
effect on prior opinions more narrowly. 
 
would not promote respect for the law as it would thwart the historic roles of the jury as finder of 
fact, protector against government overreaching, and arbiter of guilt or innocence‖); United States v. 
Settles, 530 F.3d 920, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (―[E]ven though district judges are not required to 
discount acquitted conduct, the Booker–Rita–Kimbrough–Gall line of cases may allow district judges 
to discount acquitted conduct in particular cases—that is, to vary downward from the advisory 
Guidelines range when the district judges do not find the use of acquitted conduct appropriate.‖).  
113. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d at 225.  In one instance, the First Circuit elected to rehear en banc a 
case that questioned whether a non-residential burglary ought to be classified as a ―crime of 
violence‖ under the Career Offender Sentencing Guideline.  United States v. Giggey, 551 F.3d 
27 (1st Cir. 2008).  Noting that ―there is no sign that the Sentencing Commission will resolve the 
ambiguity about its intentions in the Career Offender Guideline; an ambiguity has now existed for 
nearly twenty years,‖ the en banc court elected to overrule its previous case.  Id. at 29.  Interestingly, 
after agreeing to hear the case en banc, but before overruling the previous panel decision, the First 
Circuit indicated that the district court was free to sentence below the Guidelines range based on a 
policy disagreement with the Guideline as interpreted by the circuit’s prior precedent.  Id.; see 
United States v. Boardman, 528 F.3d 86, 86–87 (1st Cir. 2008) (―[W]e do not see why disagreement 
with the Commission‘s policy judgment (as expressed in the guideline as we interpreted it in Fiore) 
would be any less permissible a reason to deviate than disagreement with the guideline policy 
judgment at issue in Kimbrough.‖). 
114. E.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2009) (―Kimbrough 
did not ‗effectively overrule[]‘ or ‗undercut[] the reasoning‘ of Marcial-Santiago so that the two 
cases are ‗clearly irreconcilable.‘‖) (alterations in original).  
115. E.g., United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
 
Under the prior precedent rule, we are bound to follow a prior binding precedent 
―unless and until it is overruled by this court en banc or by the Supreme Court.‖ 
. . .  Kimbrough did not overrule Castro or its progeny, and so we are bound to 
apply the prior precedent rule in this appeal.  Specifically, Kimbrough never 
discussed Castro or the cases following it, or otherwise commented on non-
crack cocaine disparities, and so Kimbrough did not expressly overrule Castro 
or its progeny. . . .  [T]he most that can be said of Vega-Castillo‘s argument is 
that it pits ―reasoning against holding,‖ but not ―holding against holding.‖ 
Id. at 1236, 1238–39 (internal citations omitted). 
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These differing approaches to the effect of Kimbrough on circuit 
precedent are especially important in those circuits that essentially did not 
permit district court policy disagreements prior to Kimbrough.  By refusing to 
revisit those decisions after Kimbrough, courts can essentially limit the effect 
of Kimbrough to the crack/powder cocaine Guidelines—or at least refuse to 
revisit any Guidelines litigated prior to Kimbrough. 
The second issue resulting in circuit conflict over specific Guidelines is 
whether a particular Guideline represents a policy choice by Congress or by 
the Commission.  This conflict has played out largely in the context of the 
career offender Guideline
116
 and the fast-track Guideline.
117
  The Fifth, Ninth, 
and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that the sentencing disparities resulting 
from fast-track departures were a result of congressional rather than 
Commission policy, and thus a district court may not reduce a defendant‘s 
sentence based on a policy disagreement with the fast-track disparities.
118
  
These courts have contended that fast-track disparities are congressional 
policy because 
Congress explicitly authorized downward sentencing 
departures for fast-track programs in the Prosecutorial 
Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children 
Today Act of 2003 (―PROTECT Act‖).  The PROTECT Act 
directed the Sentencing Commission to ‗promulgate . . . a 
policy statement authorizing a downward departure of not 
more than 4 levels if the Government files a motion for such 
departure pursuant to an early disposition program authorized 
 
116. Compare United States v. Liddell, 543 F.3d 877, 882–85 (7th Cir. 2008) (recognizing 
district court authority to disagree with the policy behind U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 4B1.1 (2006) and noting that ―section 994(h) only addresses what the Sentencing Commission 
must do; it doesn‘t require sentencing courts to impose sentences ‗at or near‘ the statutory 
maximums‖) and United States v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d 651, 663 (2d Cir. 2008) (similar), with United 
States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1311 n.13 (10th Cir. 2009) (―In contrast to the crack Guidelines, 
which were not adopted at the express direction of Congress, Congress did explicitly direct the 
Sentencing Commission to incorporate into the Guidelines, for career offenders convicted of violent 
crimes, sentencing ranges that are ‗at or near the maximum term authorized.‘‖) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 994(h) (2006)) (internal citation omitted). 
117. Compare United States v. Seval, 293 F. App‘x 834 (2d Cir. 2008), and Rodriguez, 527 
F.3d at 230 (finding that a variance was appropriate after Kimbrough ―absent an unambiguous 
congressional directive barring sentencing courts from considering [the] disparity‖), with Vega-
Castillo, 540 F.3d at 1238–39, and United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d 554, 562–63 (5th Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 624 (2008) (holding that Kimbrough is not controlling on the issue of 
fast-track disparity because it ―addressed only a district court‘s discretion to vary from the Guidelines 
based on disagreement with Guideline, not Congressional, policy‖).  See generally Alison Siegler, 
Disparities and Discretion in Fast-Track Sentencing, 21 FED. SENT‘G REP. 299, 300 (2009) (noting 
the circuit split on this issue). 
118. See Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d at 737–41; Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d at 1239; Gomez-
Herrera, 523 F.3d at 563. 
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by the Attorney General and the United States Attorney.‘119 
In contrast, the First Circuit has concluded that fast-track disparity is not 
an ―express congressional directive‖ and thus, under the reasoning of 
Kimbrough—which rejected the government‘s argument that district courts 
could not deviate from the crack Guideline ―despite Congress‘s implicit 
acquiescence in, or even its endorsement of, the 100-to-1 crack/powder 
ratio‖—a district court is permitted to disagree with the Guideline on policy 
grounds.
120
  The Third Circuit has recently joined the First Circuit on this side 
of the split.
121
 
Circuits have also taken differing approaches with respect to the career 
offender Guideline, with some insisting that the Guideline reflects 
congressional policy—that is, Congress ―explicitly directed‖ the 
Commission‘s punishment of career offenders122—and others rejecting the 
view.
123
  This split appears to have been fueled by dicta in Kimbrough 
suggesting that the career offender Guideline may be appropriately 
characterized as congressional policy.
124
  Complicating the issue is that the 
government originally appears to have taken inconsistent positions on this 
question in different circuits
125
 and, more recently, the United States has 
 
119. Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d at 739 (internal citations omitted). 
120. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d at 229–30.  
121. United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, No. 08-4397, 2009 WL 2914495 (3d Cir. Sept. 14, 
2009). 
122. E.g., United States v. Vazquez, 558 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 
1135 (2010).  The Seventh Circuit appears to have initially permitted district court disagreement with 
the career offender Guideline in United States v. Liddell, 543 F.3d 877, 882–85 (7th Cir. 2008), then 
prohibited it in United States v. Welton, No. 08-3799, 2009 WL 3151162, at *4 (7th Cir. Oct. 2, 
2009) (―disavow[ing] that portion of‖ Liddell that ―did not adequately recognize that the career 
offender crack/powder disparity is the result of a legislative act‖), and finally permitted it again in 
United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
123. E.g., United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2008). 
124. In rejecting the government‘s argument that the crack/powder disparity reflected a 
congressional policy, the Kimbrough Court noted that ―[d]rawing meaning from silence is 
particularly inappropriate here, for Congress has shown that it knows how to direct sentencing 
practices in express terms.  For example, Congress has specifically required the Sentencing 
Commission to set Guidelines sentences for serious recidivist offenders ‗at or near‘ the statutory 
maximum.‖  Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 103 (2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)–(i) 
(2006)).  The Court‘s distinction between the career offender Guideline and the crack/powder 
cocaine Guidelines might signal that the career offender Guideline is mandated by Congress and 
thus, like a statutory minimum sentence, may not be ignored by a sentencing court.  On the other 
hand, the congressional directive was aimed at the Commission, rather than district courts, so there is 
some meaningful way to distinguish between this Guideline and statutory sentencing ranges. 
125. See Liddell, 543 F.3d at 884 (noting that the First Circuit rejected the government‘s 
argument, ―based on section 994(h), that the district court erred by awarding a below-guideline 
sentence to a crack career offender‖ and that the government submitted a brief before the Seventh 
Circuit ―emphasiz[ing] that a district court can sentence below the career offender guidelines if the 
court disagrees with the policy underlying the crack/powder disparity‖). 
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confessed error in cases where appellate courts have stated that district courts 
have no authority to sentence outside the career offender Guideline based on a 
policy disagreement.
126
 
One final post-Kimbrough circuit court development worth noting 
involves the presumption of reasonableness.  A number of defendants have 
argued that their within-Guidelines sentences ought not to be reviewed on 
appeal under the presumption of reasonableness because the Guidelines used 
to calculate their sentences were not a product of empirical data and national 
experience.  The opinion in Rita permitted appellate courts to employ a 
presumption of reasonableness, noting the presumption ―simply recognizes 
the real-world circumstance that when the [sentencing] judge‘s discretionary 
decision accords with the Commission‘s view of the appropriate application 
of § 3553(a) in the mine run of cases, it is probable that the sentence is 
reasonable.‖127  This holding in Rita was predicated on the Court‘s 
observation that the Commission‘s recommendation of a sentencing range 
will ordinarily ―reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve 
§ 3553(a)‘s objectives.‖128  But Kimbrough acknowledged that not all 
Guidelines necessarily reflect such an approximation.  Indeed, the Kimbrough 
Court noted that ―the Commission itself has reported that the crack/powder 
disparity produces disproportionately harsh sanctions, i.e., sentences for crack 
cocaine offenses ‗greater than necessary‘ in light of the purposes of 
sentencing set forth in § 3553(a).‖129  Seizing on this language from 
Kimbrough, several defendants note that if a Guideline does not reflect a 
rough approximation of the § 3553(a) sentencing goals—that is, if a Guideline 
―was not promulgated according to usual Sentencing Commission procedures 
and did not take into account ‗empirical data and national experience‘‖130—
then the analysis offered in support of the presumption in Rita is no longer 
applicable and the presumption of reasonableness ought not apply. 
The two circuits that have addressed this argument have rejected it.  The 
Fifth Circuit has repeatedly rejected this argument,
131
 and the Tenth Circuit 
recently rejected it as well.
132
  (It does not appear that the other circuits have 
 
126. See Corner, 598 F.3d at 414 (noting that the ―United States has confessed error and asked 
us to overrule Welton‖ and that before the ―Supreme Court, the Solicitor General confessed error in 
United States v. Vazquez‖). 
127. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007).   
128. Id. at 350. 
129. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110. 
130. E.g., United States v. Davila-Romero, 297 F. App‘x 386, 388 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
131. E.g., United States v. Duarte, 569 F.3d 528, 530–31 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Saucedo-Martinez, 323 F. App‘x 373, 374 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hernandez-Funez, 307 
F. App‘x 799, 800 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Gonzales-Camacho, 301 F. App‘x 314, 315–16 
(5th Cir. 2008); Davila-Romero, 297 F. App‘x at 387–88. 
132. United States v. Tapia-Cortez, 327 F. App‘x 793, 796 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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yet addressed the question.)  The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument even 
when made by defendants sentenced under the crack cocaine Guideline that 
was specifically at issue in Booker.
133
  According to the Fifth Circuit, 
Kimbrough did not address the presumption of reasonableness.  It explained 
that ―[a]lthough some language in Kimbrough could be read to support 
appellant‘s argument . . . the square holding of Rita in favor of our 
presumption sufficiently supports that presumption even in light of 
Kimbrough.‖134  This reasoning seems suspect, and the court offered no 
analysis to support it.  Instead, the Fifth Circuit‘s position seems based, at 
least in part, on a wish to avoid ―wholesale, appellate-level reconception of 
the role of the Guidelines and review of the methodologies of the Sentencing 
Commission.‖135  In suggesting that appellate review might be dependent 
upon whether the Commission incorporated empirical data and national 
experience when formulating individual Guidelines, the Kimbrough Court 
appears to invite ―a piece-by-piece analysis of the empirical grounding behind 
each part of the sentencing guidelines‖—an analysis that the Fifth Circuit 
seems eager to avoid.
136
 
The Tenth Circuit‘s justification for continuing to impose the presumption 
of reasonableness for Guidelines that are without an empirical basis is more 
troubling.  The court noted that Kimbrough did not address the presumption of 
reasonableness issue.
137
  In addition, the court added that its ―presumption of 
reasonableness is based on the purpose of promoting uniformity in 
sentencing.‖138  This justification runs counter to the Supreme Court‘s opinion 
in Rita, which ―appeared to deny that the presumption creates a legal bias for 
within-Guidelines sentences, stating that the presumption has no ‗independent 
legal effect‘ but merely reflects the reality that a within-Guidelines sentence is 
likely to be reasonable.‖139  Although uniformity in sentencing remains an 
important goal after Booker, as described below, uniformity may only be 
furthered through certain means.  Because the Booker Sixth Amendment 
remedy was premised on the restoration of district court discretion, uniformity 
may not be achieved through restricting that discretion; otherwise federal 
 
133. See United States v. Garrett, 318 F. App‘x 294 (5th Cir. 2009). 
134. Davila-Romero, 297 F. App‘x at 388. 
135. Duarte, 569 F.3d at 530. 
136. Id. 
137. Tapia-Cortez, 327 F. App‘x at 796 (―Kimbrough does not bear on whether we should 
apply our presumption of reasonableness.  Kimbrough addressed whether the district court, in 
exercising its discretion, was permitted to consider whether a Guideline has an empirical basis, and 
the Supreme Court held that it was.‖). 
138. Id. (citing United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006)). 
139. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 6, at 21. 
